INTRODUCTION
With the possible exception of John Marshall, the Justice most frequently quoted by legal scholars is almost certainly Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Following that practice, I begin with an appropriate Holmesian injunction: our "business as thinkers is to make plainer the way from some thing to the whole of things."' Accordingly, the purpose of this Article is to suggest that invitation for courts to intrude even more deeply into jury functions are apparent: in both Twombly and Iqbal, the Court disregarded possible factual scenarios that would have made the defendants' actions unlawful." Strikingly, Iqbal rejected the "plausibility" of the plaintiffs' allegations simply because five of the nine Justices were willing to imagine "more likely explanations" for the defendants' behavior than the unlawful conspiracy that the plaintiff alleged.
16

C. Rule 23
Finally, the Roberts Court made the requirements for certifying class actions under Rule 23 more demanding. Inc. v. Dukes construed Rule 23(a) to impose on plaintiffs the burden of showing a significantly higher level of "commonality" in an identified class than previously required. 7 Indeed, its method of analysis-probing proposed commonalities for every possible "dissimilarity" that could be teased outsuggested an approach designed to defeat a wide range of class actions at the certification stage.
The Court continued this trend in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, which relied almost exclusively on Wal-Mart and declared that the "rigorous analysis" conduct; these explanations were employed in a manner akin to judicial fact-finding." (citations omitted)).
16 556 U.S. at 681.
17 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (explaining that commonality requires a "common contention . . . capable of classwide resolution-which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke" These decisions construing Rules 8, 23, and 56 share three common characteristics. The first is their highly questionable legal foundation. The decisions were not based on changes in the text of the rules or their original meanings. Although the Federal Rules have been amended on numerous occasions, the relevant standards in these three rules have never been substantively altered since their adoption.
The Court's 1986 trilogy of summary judgment decisions came almost a quarter of a century after Rule 56 had been last amended. These 1963 amendments made few changes to the rule and no revisions whatsoever in the standard it had established for granting summary judgment. 20 Thus, the standard stood untouched when the Court issued its summary judgment trilogy in 1986, and no subsequent amendment altered that standard in a way that could justify Scott.
Similarly, the Roberts Court's decisions addressing Rules 23(a) and 2 3 (b)(3) construed language that had not been altered since its initial adoption in 1966. The 1966 amendments rewrote Rule 23(a) to identify characteristics that were "necessary but not sufficient" for class actions and reworked Rule 23(b) to define additional conditions that justified three different types of class actions. 2 ' One of the principal purposes of the amendments was to make the requirements for class actions less "abstract" and the class action form more widely available. 22 Moreover, the Advisory Committee stated explicitly that, where "questions common to the class predominate," an action under subsection (b)(3) "may remain" as a class action "despite the need, if liability is found, for a separate determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class." 23 Thus, contrary to the reasoning in Comcast, Rule 2 3 (b)( 3 ) was not intended to require that damages calculations be part of the predominance requirement analysis.
When the 1966 amendments spurred an increasing number of class actions and gave rise to a variety of new problems, Rule 23 was altered to tighten 20 The standard for summary judgment appeared in subsection (c) from 1938 until 2010, when it was moved to subsection (a); the Committee Notes on Rules stated that the "standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged." See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) advisory committee's note to the 2010 amendments.
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendments; see also A. Benjamin Spencer, supra note 17, at 450-51 (discussing the origins of Rule 23 and its new features).
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendments. 23 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendments.
some procedures and ensure greater fairness to class members. 24 However, none of these post-1966 amendments changed the relevant text of subsections (a) and (b). Amendments in 1998 added certain interlocutory appeal provisions, 2 5 and more substantial changes in 2003 modified subsections (c) and (e) and added new subsections (g) and (h). These latter amendments altered certain timing and notice provisions, deleted language authorizing conditional class certification, expanded the process for review of proposed settlements, and provided for more rigorous scrutiny of class counsel and attorneys' fees. 26 However, none of these amendments altered the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 2 3 (b)( 3 )-Similarly, the Court's decisions redefining pleading standards under Rule 8 changed the meaning of a textual provision that had never been substantively altered. The few minor amendments to the rule made over the years were consistently identified as "technical" or "stylistic only." 27 Two conclusions about the Court's recent decisions addressing Rules 8, 23, and 56 are warranted. First, none of the decisions were based on any alterations in either the relevant text of the rules or their original meaning. Indeed, in imposing a plausibility requirement for pleadings, Twombly and Iqbal not only departed from the text and original understanding of Rule 8 but also rejected hundreds of years of legal practice defining the nature of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 28 Second, the decisions departed from the Court's own precedents. 29 1119-20 (2002) (arguing that the rulemaking process serves as a constraint upon judicial interpretation that strays from the text of the Rules).
B. Practical Impact
The second shared characteristic of the decisions construing these three Federal Rules is the practical social consequences they bring. All promise to discourage suits, burden plaintiffs, and defeat large numbers of claims. 35 They also promise to defeat those claims more quickly and with much less cost to defendants.
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The Rule 56 decisions often relieve defendants of the need to present evidence, and they allow courts to evaluate the record more exactingly and deny the existence of "genuine" factual disputes more easily. 37 They authorize courts to disregard and, in effect, weigh evidence and make subjective judgments as to both the "plausibility" of claims and the subjective motives of defendants. While the impact of the decisions has varied, evidence suggests that the trilogy significantly changed litigation practice in the lower federal courts and encouraged wider use of summary judgment. 38 One study found that between 1975 and 2000 summary judgment motions in the federal courts nearly doubled and that courts granted them twice as often as they had in the past. 39 Other studies have found that such motions have 35 Insofar as the rulemakers (in contrast to the Court) sought to limit allegedly "frivolous" suits and curb related litigation abuses, they attempted to do so by amending other rules. See, e.g 40 Twombly and 1qbal proved even more effective in achieving anti-plaintiff results. First, they allow dismissal at an earlier stage, thereby freeing defendants from the need to mount a defense or even plead. Second, they require greater factual support and thereby place heavier burdens on plaintiffs before they even file suit. Third, they authorize a high degree of judicial discretion and encourage dismissals based on relatively subjective evaluations of the pleadings. Finally, and most restrictively, they require plaintiffs to plead facts before they have been able to obtain discovery. That requirement is especially likely to be fatal in the countless cases in which corporate and government defendants are in sole possession of critical evidence. After Twombly and Iqbal, motions to dismiss increased rapidly and succeeded more often. 4 1 A recent study found that the two decisions "negatively affected" at least 15.4% of employment discrimination cases, summary judgment motions made from 12% to 19% and an increase in cases terminated by summary judgment from 3.7% to 7.8%). Before the shift to "notice pleading" accomplished by the Federal Rules, motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense were the principal tools by which factually insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from going to trial . . . . But with the advent of "notice pleading," the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function any more, and its place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment.
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Celotex reasoned, in other words, that summary judgment should be easier to obtain because "notice pleading" During the confirmation process, then-Judge John Roberts was asked whether he would support "the little guy" or "the big guy." He replied easily that he would simply ensure that "the Constitution and laws of the United States" determined who won. 50 Unfortunately, no one asked him whether he would try to see that "the little guy" could at least get "the big guy" into court so that the Constitution and laws could actually be applied to his claim. 
C. Social Congruence
The third characteristic that the decisions construing Rules 8, 23, and 56 share is their near perfect congruence with the practical social results that commonly flow from the decisions of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.s" In constitutional, statutory, and common-law matters, those Courts regularly burdened plaintiffs while protecting corporate 52 and governmental 5 3 defendants. 53 While the Court protected governments against tort and civil rights claims, it treated governmental units much less favorably when they sought to enforce certain kinds of regulatory, civil rights, and pro-consumer laws or sought to implement affirmative action plans. See, e.g The majority's defenders contend that those decisions flowed from constitutional principles mandating strict limits on federal judicial power. The problem with that defense, however, is that the Court's use of the judicial power has been consistent mainly in its social results but not in any principled practice of "restraint" or deference to other levels and branches of government. Most commonly, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts found their judicial limitation principles applicable when asked to uphold claims of consumers, employees, tort victims, environmentalists, and civil rights plaintiffs. For these claims, they portrayed the judicial power as largely or wholly impotent.
76 Just as often, however, when the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts were asked to protect certain other interests, they ignored their principles of judicial limitation and exercised their power actively and robustly? The decisions of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts construing Rules 8, 23, and 56 stand prominently in the "boldness for business" half of that jurisprudential divide. First, they exemplify the willingness of the conservative Justices to use the judicial power aggressively, for those decisions essentially rewrote rules that Congress had authoritatively adopted and that the Court itself had previously construed differently. Second, they exemplify the conservative Justices' typical assertion of activist and robust judicial power when the result is to constrain or defeat tort, employee, consumer, antitrust, environmental, and civil rights plaintiffs.
III. "THE WHOLE OF THINGS"
The three common characteristics of the Court's decisions construing Rules 8, 23, and 56-their break from established interpretations, their tendency to bring similar social results, and the congruence of those results with the characteristic social results of the Court's decisions in other areassuggest that a common inspiration links those Federal Rules decisions not only with one another but also with much of the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.
That common inspiration cannot simply be the perceived desirability of reducing litigation costs, limiting the federal caseload, or addressing the genuine difficulties that class actions present. are relevant, they are inadequate to explain the Court's decisions. First, any effort to change rules controlling access to the federal courts necessarily involves an assessment of social consequences, including which types of claims and litigants will be advantaged and which will be disadvantaged.
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Thus, the general goal of limiting the federal caseload, however warmly embraced, can never be adequate to determine which specific limitations should be adopted. That determination requires some additional criterion or a more specific goal. Second, while every member of the Court is sensitive to docket pressures and has supported measures designed to limit the federal caseload, 82 the Justices have regularly disagreed as to many specific measures. diverse but often interrelated social values and assumptions that justify a range of partisan policies under the banner of a heralded "common good." 8 They scorn and often wholly reject government economic regulation, and they encourage a true believer's faith in the operation of a near-perfect "free market" and the social benevolence of supposedly "rational" market behavior. 89 These ideologies preach that efforts to impose burdens and liabilities on business are inefficient and that litigation against business wastes resources, destroys jobs, stalls the economy, and raises consumer prices. Implicit, and sometimes explicit, are the familiar counterposed assumptions of the worthy and unworthy: individuals who are able, honest, moral, and hard-working against those who are lazy, foolish, undisciplined, or immoral. Market ideologies assume that the former earn their livelihoods by hard work while pursuing the world's fair and ample opportunities for economic success; they assume that the latter seek to live off the work of others, exploit overly generous social welfare programs, and pursue "frivolous" lawsuits in the meretricious search for free riches. Among the most designing advocates of those market ideologies are the forces behind the "tort reform" movement, which is a well-financed and well-organized campaign to protect business interests by restricting judicial remedies, imposing heavy burdens on claimants, and limiting or denying access to the courts. 90 Ultimately, those market ideologies lend themselves to justifying 89 It is essential to distinguish contemporary "market ideologies"-sweeping, uncompromising, and intensely partisan-from professional economic analyses of markets, which are careful, nuanced, qualified, and often highly skeptical of market behavior. See generally ALBERT 0. wondrous flexibility, such market ideologies can be adroitly contoured to justify almost anything that serves the interests of powerful economic groups. Those market ideologies and "tort reform" goals call for exactly the kind of rulings that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have typically supplied. They are consistent with their decisions construing Rules 8, 23, and 56, as well as their decisions addressing many constitutional, statutory, and common law issues. Those ideologies and goals seem a common inspiration that helped shape the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts and produced the cornucopia of anti-plaintiff decisions that flooded the doctrinal landscape. Although the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts is the product of varied factors and encompasses different shifts and emphases, ideology has been a critical driving force in shaping its social imperatives and doctrinal interpretations. See, e.g., Burbank & Farhang, supra note 55, at 1569 (noting that research on these courts "assumes that the phenomenon in question is a manifestation of the ideological preference of an increasingly conservative Supreme Court"); Stone, supra note 78, at 89 (noting that the decisions of conservative Justices Rehnquist, Roberts, Few recent events capture the ideological overlap between the shared social imperatives of the conservative Justices and the market ideologies of the Republican Party better than the Lilly Ledbetter case. In a paradigmatic gender-based employment discrimination suit in 2007, the five-Justice conservative bloc ruled that the short 18o-day statute of limitations applicable in equal pay suits began running on the date the employer made its initial discriminatory decision. The ruling not only denied Ledbetter's claim but also promised to bar the overwhelming majority of all such future suits.
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Two years later, after the 2oo8 election gave Democrats the presidency and large majorities in both houses of Congress, they enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act: this act extended the statute of limitations in equal pay cases by providing that the clock begins running anew with each paycheck that reflects an employer's discriminatory decision. 98 The congressional vote on the act tracked party lines almost perfectly. With near unanimity, Republicans in both the House and the Senate backed the ruling of the Court's conservative majority by opposing the measure.
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Similarly, few cases illustrate the determination of the conservative Justices to impose their anti-plaintiff policy goals better than the recent decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. 10 0 There, the five-Justice bloc upheld a contractual provision that prohibited customers from bringing an antitrust class action and compelled them not only to arbitrate their claims but to do so individually. 0 1 The customers argued that, for individual claimants, the cost of pursuing an antitrust claim would be prohibitive and that, as a practical matter, their claims could not proceed unless they could be brought in a class form. In the Senate, the vote was sixty-one to thirty-six, with every Democrat in attendance and two Independents voting in favor; only four Republicans-the party's only four female Senators-supported the measure. i55 CONG.
REC. 14oo (2009).
[Vol. 162: 1731 purpose of Rule 23 and transforming the concepts of legal rights and remedies into meaningless abstractions, the five-Justice conservative bloc dismissed the argument as irrelevant. 103 The fact that an individual claim "is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy" they explained, "does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy."1 04 Thus, the majority sanctioned a contractual weapon that effectively barred from any possible forum an untold number of potentially meritorious federal statutory claims. On a more general level, both Matsushita and Twombly illustrate the conservative majority's faith in the benevolence of the "free market" and "rational" market behavior. Both denied any "plausible" reason to think that corporate defendants could have acted in an anticompetitive manner. Both 103 Id. at 2309. The majority went so far as to declare that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) itself "trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims." Id. at 2312 n.5. The act, it continued, "favor[s] the absence of litigation when that is the consequence of a class-action waiver, since 'its principal purpose' is the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms." Id.
104 Id. at 2311. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013), presents a revealing contrast. There, Justice Scalia dissented and urged stricter certification requirements in securities fraud class actions: "Certification of the class," he argued, "is often, if not usually, the prelude to a substantial settlement by the defendant because the costs and risks of litigating further are so high." Id. at 1206 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Noticeably, sympathizing with the defendant's plight in Amgen, he did not apply the pivotal reasoning he employed in Italian Colors to disregard the plaintiffs' plight: that, however burdensome they might be, the "costs and risks of litigating further" did not "constitute the elimination of the right to pursue" the legal options that were formally available.
There seems to be a difference, too, between the relative lack of concern for the fate of members of the proposed plaintiff class in Italian Colors and the noticeably greater concern shown for them in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v The unfavorable treatment that the conservative Justices give to class action plaintiffs revealed itself similarly in the contrasting interpretations they gave to the relevant federal statutes in Concepcion and Italian Colors. In the former, they reasoned that the FAA should not be construed to allow state law to bar enforcement of some, though not all, arbitration agreements because such a construction would defeat the purpose of the arbitration statute. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752-53 (2011) (holding that a state may not require procedures inconsistent with the FAA). In contrast, in Italian Colors they reasoned that the federal antitrust laws should be construed to allow arbitration agreements to bar many, though not all, antitrust actions even though that construction would defeat the purpose of the antitrust laws. 133 S. Ct. at 2310-12. They justified their sweeping construction of the FAA by declaring that "the act cannot be held to destroy itself." Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (citations omitted). They justified their shrunken construction of the antitrust laws by declaring that "[n]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs." Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The two statements constituted not "principles" for judicial reasoning but rationales for predetermined results. Had the Justices wished opposite results in the two cases, they could easily have switched the two statements from one opinion to the other. also made what was tantamount to judicial findings of fact based solely on the assumption that free market actors would not behave in an economically "irrational" -and therefore unlawful -manner. 05 Consequently, both insisted that only very specific facts evidencing such behavior could possibly make contrary allegations the least bit credible.
Easing the path to summary judgment, Matsushita found an "absence of a plausible motive to enter into the alleged predatory pricing" because defendants were "presumably rational businesses." 10 6 Easing the corporate path to dismissal, Twombly announced that the "natural explanation" for defendants' behavior was simply "routine market conduct" and "the natural, unilateral reaction of each [defendant] intent on keeping its regional dominance." 07 The influence of market ideologies on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts is especially striking when those assertions in 
."tos
Twombly's embrace of market ideology, moreover, proved particularly revealing when it drew on what "history teaches."o' 0 Not surprisingly, it selected a historical lesson that confirmed its ideological assumptions while at the same time ignoring historical lessons that challenged those assumptions. 110 Most obviously, it ignored the lesson made clear only a year after the ruling in Matsushita, when a massive stock market crash exposed pervasive fraud and chicanery in the savings and loan industry. Indeed, another massive economic collapse followed Twombly itself, this one exposing pervasive fraud and chicanery in the banking, real estate, and financial services industries. That crash taught such an undeniable lesson that it drove another market ideologue, Alan Greenspan, into "a state of shocked disbelief" and forced him to acknowledge that his market thinking contained a fundamental "flaw.""' Large corporations and other supposedly rational economic actors could behave collusively, irrationally, and unlawfully, Greenspan reluctantly admitted, and they could do so on the broadest scale imaginable.11 2 The conservative Justices, however, have not acknowledged that flaw or modified their jurisprudence to reflect that vivid historical lesson. The commitment of the conservative Justices to market ideologies is so ingrained that it revealed itself just as strongly in cases far removed from issues of economic regulation. In Town of Newton v. Rumery, for example, the conservative Justices upheld a plaintiff's agreement to waive his right to sue under § 1983 in exchange for a prosecutor's promise not to pursue a criminal action."' They reasoned that the agreement was voluntary, benefitted both parties, and "would not adversely affect the relevant public interests."
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Choosing to decide the case by applying "traditional common-law principles" of contract,' they ruled that such agreements were enforceable because they were "highly rational" and not "inherently coercive." 1 6
Four dissenters highlighted the decisive influence of the majority's market ideology."' The mere fact that an agreement was "voluntary" and "highly rational," they stressed, was hardly sufficient to show that it should be enforced."' "Otherwise, a promise to pay a state trooper $20 for not issuing a ticket for a traffic violation, or a promise to contribute to the police department's retirement fund in exchange for the dismissal of a felony 117 To demonstrate the influence of market ideology, the dissenters pointed to a variety of facts that should have made the agreement unenforceable but that were ignored by the majority.
Id. at 410-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
B. Textualism, Originalism, and Traditionalism
The common characteristics of the Court's Federal Rules decisions and the pervasive influence of market and "tort reform" ideologies suggest troubling conclusions about the three judicial methodologies that the conservative Justices frequently invoke: textualism, originalism, and traditionalism. Although those methodologies are standard tools of judicial decisionmaking, they are frequently inadequate for any number of reasons, including their generous capacity for supporting widely varied or wholly contradictory conclusions.
128 Indeed, all three concepts have been defined in differing ways to authorize widely divergent and even discordant criteria.1
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The conservative Justices, moreover, have used all three methodologies in dubious and inconsistent ways. As textualists, they have interpreted language in shifting and arbitrary ways;o 30 as originalists, they have cherry-picked sources and avoided serious historical analysis;1 1 and as traditionalists, they have arbitrarily conferred normative status on some practices while simply disregarding others.1
32
In limiting class actions, for example, the conservative Justices invoked the "historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court."
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They interpreted "tradition" to mean that individual plaintiffs had the right to control their own independent actions and consequently that "tradition" argued against certifying class actions. The conservative Justices, however, ignored the fact that this same "tradition" also readily supported the contrary purpose of expanding the use of class actions. Indeed, one of the "original" purposes of the 1966 amendments was to assist individuals with economically nonviable individual claims by enabling them to join together (arguing that the Court cannot strike down on First Amendment grounds a statute that has "the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic"); BISKUPIC, supra note 131, at 269-70 (noting that in some cases Justice Scalia argued that more than an interest in social policy was necessary to justify federal action while finding "public morality" sufficient to justify federal action in others); RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 222, 327 (1997) (describing Justice Scalia's use of "tradition" to oppose liberal social policies); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 97-109 (1991) (noting Justice Scalia's reliance on "historical tradition" and arguing that such traditions are subject to manipulation). For the Court's use of "tradition" in one area of law, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski to assert an economically viable class claim.1 34 Thus, in such situations class actions are essential to preserve that very "historic tradition" and ensure that everyone may secure "his own day in court." Equally obvious, the conservative Justices ignored that very same "historic tradition" by consistently enforcing arbitration clauses in form contracts. Those decisions denied millions of individuals the possibility of pursuing their "own day in court."
13 5 Indeed, in their arbitration decisions, the conservative Justices accomplished a hat trick of methodological treason. They not only ignored the "historic tradition," but they also abandoned the text of the Federal Arbitration Act and rejected its "original" meaning as well. 13 6 Thus, the conservative Justices adapted their judicial methodologies to serve their ideological purposes. That practice strengthens the inference that those same ideological purposes inspired their decisions on the three Federal Rules-decisions that were, after all, unsupported by text, original meaning, judicial precedent, or "historic tradition." Those considerations point to an even broader conclusion: in construing many other federal legal sources, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts also likely pursued those same ideological goals. The broader significance of the Court's decisions construing Rules 8, 23, and 56, therefore, is that they suggest that those same ideological goals-not the conservatives' announced legal methodologiesshaped much or most of their jurisprudence. (explaining that "Rule 2 3 (b)( 3 ) was specifically designed to correct a market impediment to access and rights enforcement for certain kinds of small claims" and, as a result, "claims that never would have been pursued outside the group became viable"). There is no principled reason why the proper construction of those three Federal Rules would bring the same practical social results as those brought by the proper construction of other federal law provisions. Yet the fact remains that the conservative Justices frequently construed a range of quite different legal sources to achieve those same congruent social results. How can this pattern of judicial decisionmaking be explained?
One possibility is that the textualist, originalist, and traditionalist methodologies of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts revealed that all authoritative sources of federal law embodied the same practical policies. That possibility, however, defies credibility. The Constitution and the widely varied provisions of the U.S. Code were adopted and subsequently amended many times over the course of two and a quarter centuries. Those adoptions and amendments were made by diverse majorities seeking to address diverse challenges arising from the ever-changing needs of an ever-changing society. They could hardly all embody the same policies.
Indeed, it is apparent that many of those legal sources establish and seek to effectuate policies quite different from, and in conflict with, those the Court infused into its Federal Rules decisions. If textualism, originalism, and traditionalism led the conservative Justices to find that many varied federal law provisions reflected the same policies, that result would immediately reveal their methodologies as inherently flawed, easily manipulable, and ideologically inspired.
An alternate possibility is that those textualist, originalist, and traditionalist methodologies demonstrated that the policies found in some narrow subset of constitutional and statutory provisions were consistent with market ideologies and that the conservative Justices chose to interpret the three Federal Rules and other federal legal sources to conform to the policies of that particular subset. If so, however, that would mean that in construing the three Federal Rules and those other federal legal sources the conservative Justices were not guided by the methodologies they purported to employ but were, instead, guided by the policies they found in that select and narrow subset of otherwise unrelated federal law sources. If true, that would again mean that their selection of policies was directed not by their proclaimed methodologies but by personal preferences consistent with their market ideologies.
All things considered, then, the most plausible explanation for the parallel social results that mark so many of the decisions of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts in so many areas of law is the common inspiration of market ideologies. 37 Two conclusions seem unavoidable. One is that the proclaimed textualist, originalist, and traditionalist methodologies of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts frequently had little or no influence on their actual decisionmaking. 13 8 The other is that the proclaimed faith of the conservative Justices in those methodologies blinded them to the inadequacies of all three methods and thereby obscured the extent to which those inadequacies allowed their personal views to color wide swaths of federal law.
C. Judicial Ironies and "Living" Law
Finally, the decisions of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts construing Rules 8, 23, and 56 point to a series of revealing ironies. The first, and most obvious, is that the ostensible goal of limiting the federal caseload-even if it were accepted as an adequate explanation for the Justices' decisionsreveals that the Court was acting pragmatically in response to practical pressures. That, in turn, would illustrate the "living" nature of law and 137 The conservative Justices did not, of course, consciously and purposely adopt "party" policies. Rather, they examined issues through the ideological preconceptions and assumptions shared with most of their fellow Republicans. Those principles are so deeply embedded that their influence may have remained largely undetected while their promptings seemed nothing but "natural" and logical premises and conclusions. What has been called "motivated reasoning" shapes judicial decisionmaking, but it does so in varying degrees with its strongest influence on relatively open and contested issues. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article III's Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 443-52 (2012) (discussing the impact of societal influence and "motivated reasoning" on constitutional decisionmaking).
138 Indeed, their ideological imperatives seemed to determine their thinking even on relatively technical issues of actual market theory. In 1988, the Court adopted one aspect of market theorythe "efficient market" hypothesis-to make it easier for plaintiffs to assert securities fraud claims. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-50 (1988 ). In Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 , 1203 -04 (2013 , where the Court refused to raise the requirements for certifying a Rule 23(b)( 3 ) class action, four of the conservatives wrote separately to urge reconsideration of the merits and use of that theory. Alito suggested that the "efficient markets" theory may rest on a "faulty economic premise," id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring); Scalia declared the Court's use of the theory "regrettable" and responsible for "unquestionably disastrous" consequences, id.at 1206 (Scalia, J., dissenting); and Thomas (joined by Kennedy and, in relevant part, by Scalia) declared that the Basic Court's use of the efficient market theory was "questionable" and suggested that it be reconsidered, id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Market theories that aided plaintiffs, in other words, should be discarded.
Similarly, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131.S. Ct. 1740 (2011) , where the conservative Justices ruled that consumer adhesion contracts requiring waiver of the right to use class action forms were enforceable as written, they casually dispensed with the fact that there had been no meaningful "market" bargaining: they noted simply that "the times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past." Id. at 1750. When the assumption of "rational" economic bargaining that undergirds market theory could be used to aid plaintiffs, it too should be discarded.
demonstrate that textualism, originalism, and traditionalism often provide inadequate, irrelevant, and easily dismissible guides.
A second irony is that originalism and traditionalism fit awkwardly with the unrestrained corporate behavior that the market ideologies of the conservative majority encourage. Free market capitalism spawns a social and economic dynamic that challenges established practices and brings constant and often highly disruptive social changes. Over the centuries it has transformed and continues to transform the world, discarding or reshaping inherited behavior patterns while spurring new and diverse practices in their place. The result is a relentless process of remolding and recreating traditions and a steady withering of the ability of each succeeding generation to accurately understand whatever "original meanings" might actually have existed and might otherwise have been discernible and applicable. That process disrupts and recreates "traditions," and it renders any such original meanings increasingly less knowable, reliable, and specific. Thus, it makes contemporary claims about the purported existence and legal significance of proposed "traditions" and "original" meanings increasingly dubious and unpersuasive.
A third irony is that those dynamic social processes illustrate the classic, if paradoxical, function of "originalist" reasoning. 39 Normative appeals to ancient ideals, venerable texts, or vanished "golden ages" are designed to indict the values and practices of the present, and they are consequently anything but "conservative." They are, in fact, disruptive and even radical. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, originalism functions in practice not as a guide for an actual return to some earlier and truer legal regime-a practical impossibility in most, if not all, cases-but as a technique to undermine the status quo and install some novel regime.
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The final irony is that contemporary ideological originalism turns out to be an effective, if covert, method of developing a "living" law and "living" constitutionalism. In spite of the sharp contrast in contemporary debates between advocates of "originalism" and "living constitutionalism,"1 41 both approaches are methods of shaping and justifying constitutional change. Indeed, the contemporary ideological "originalism" of the Republican Party is itself, like so many earlier constitutional rhetorics in the nation's history, simply a product of historical context, political conflict, and the ordinary practice of American constitutional debate. It was inspired and energized by a political determination to overthrow the Court's post-New Deal decisions, and it was quickly embraced by those who assumed that the Founders could not have supported the modern developments they opposed: gay rights, income taxes, secularism, labor unionism, racial equality, women's liberation, affirmative action, social welfare programs, environmental protection, antidiscrimination laws, and extensive federal regulation of the economy. It was embraced, in other words, by those who found the rhetoric and values of market ideologies politically, socially, and economically attractive or at least useful for their purposes. Ultimately, then, the principal difference between contemporary ideological "originalism" and "living constitutionalism" lies only in the formalities each employs and the substantive values their advocates design them to serve.1
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CONCLUSION
In construing Federal Rules 8, 23, and 56, the "expensive delicate ship"1 43 of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts exposed the intensely ideological bases of their jurisprudence and demonstrated the "living" nature of the law. Indeed, the Roberts Court pushed those ideological imperatives into the realm of the Federal Rules far more extensively and vigorously than the Rehnquist Court, suggesting that the current conservative majority has grown even more active and extreme in its determination to infuse into the law the policies embedded in its market ideologies. 1 " Although the conservative Justices on both Courts proclaimed adherence to judicial methodologies that supposedly ensured their legal "objectivity," they steadily and methodically remade the law to serve the substantive policies and partisan values of the contemporary Republican "conservatism" from which they sprang.14 5 that the possibility of 'frivolous' claims-if defined simply as claims with no legal merit-warrants closing the courthouse doors to people" who claim that their constitutional rights have been violated. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
